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INTERVENTION BY AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY IN A SUIT BY ITS INSURED
AGAINST AN UNINSURED MOTORIST
RONALD F. SCEGLIO

Public concern for the innocent victim of an automobile accident
who must bear the burden of his injuries caused by a financially irresponsible tortfeasor, has brought about a number of attempts to provide
him with some means of compensation. These include establishment
of financial responsibility laws, compulsory insurance laws, and uninsured motorist laws. 1 Uninsured motorist insurance was introduced in
the middle 1950s to compensate for inadequacies of the financial responsibility and compulsory insurance laws. The purpose of this coverage
was to protect the insured when he was legally entitled to recover but
precluded from doing so by circumstances which prevented recovery
from the tortfeasor. With the great expansion of the automobile industry since the end of World War II, the number of uninsured
motorists has increased to the point that it is estimated that twenty
percent of the eighty million private passenger automobiles in the
United States are not covered by liability insurance.2 Statistically, one
out of every five accidents will involve an automobile which is
uninsured. Because a large volume of litigation is generated in this
area there is a need for the establishment of procedural guidelines.
TEXAS' UNINSURED

MOTORIST STATUTE

Most of the states have made uninsured motorist coverage a matter
of state legislation.8 Many of the states have made uninsured motorist
coverage mandatory, i.e. the insured is required to obtain it and the
companies are required to provide it. In two states, Maryland and North
Dakota, and in the District of Columbia, uninsured motorist insurance
is neither required to be purchased nor provided. The majority of the
states require insurance companies to provide uninsured motorist
coverage if desired by the insured, but allow him to reject the coverage.
Texas follows the majority.
1 For a review of the factors leading up to the development of uninsured
insurance see Wnls, A GUIDE To UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 3-17 (1st ed.
2 N.Y. Times News Service report of a Department of Transportation study,
1970, as reprinted in Automobile Ins. News, INs. DIG., Taylor publications, June
8 A compilation of summaries of state laws relating to uninsured motorist
can be found in CCH AUTO. L. REP. in the section on Financial Responsibility.
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Uninsured motorist insurance was approved by the Insurance
Commission in Texas in 1957, and afterwards was written into the
standard automobile policy in Texas.4 Voluntary coverage has been
available in Texas since 1957, but it was not until 1967 that Texas
enacted legislation concerning this coverage. 5
Texas' uninsured motorist statute is divided into three sections.
Section (1) provides that all automobile liability insurance policies
issued in Texas are to include uninsured motorist coverage, but gives
the insured the power to reject the coverage. Section (2) authorizes
the State Board of Insurance to define "uninsured motor vehicle" and
"promulgate the forms of the uninsured motorist coverage." Section
(3) provides the insurance company with subrogation rights to the
proceeds of a settlement or judgment in favor of its insured, when it
makes a payment to him.6
The statute has no procedural guidelines for making claims under
the policy, nor for bringing suit to recover from the uninsured motorist,
or from the insurer. Also, there are no provisions which expressly or
impliedly permit or deny the insurer the right to intervene on behalf
of a defendant uninsured motorist in a suit brought against him by
the company's insured. Therefore, the rights of the parties in uninsured
motorist litigation are primarily determined in accordance with the
provisions and judicial construction of the insurance policy supplemented by law in related areas.
INTERVENTION IN GENERAL

One issue directly related to litigation involving uninsured motorist
coverage is the right of the insurance company to intervene on behalf
of the uninsured motorist when he is sued by the injured insured
party. In general, anyone having an interest in the subject matter of
litigation between other parties may intervene for the purpose of
asserting and protecting that interest7 Such an interested person does
not have to rely on the litigants to protect him; through intervention
he can protect his own rights.8
If the party has no interest which could be affected by the proceedings,
he cannot intervene.9 Intervention will not be allowed if it will delay
the trial, complicate the issues or work injury to the original parties in
4 Address by Pat Maloney, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Belli Seminar, Dec. 7, 1968.
5 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Supp. 1970).
6 Id. The latter part of § (3) relates to the situation when the defendant motorist is

insured by a company which becomes insolvent.
7Smalley v. Taylor, 53 Tex. 668 (1870); Graves v. Hall, 27 Tex. 148 (1863); Eccles v.
Hill, 13 Tex. 65 (1854).
8 Pool v. Sanford, 52 Tex. 621 (1880).
9 Meyberg & Wangelin v. Steagall & Co., 51 Tex. 351 (1879); Leach v. Millard, 9 Tex.
551 (1853).
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the preparation and presentation of their cases. This is particularly
true where none of the rights of the intervenor are jeopardized by
denying the intervention.' 0 Intervention will not be permitted where
the intervenor, if he were the sole defendant, is not entitled to prevent
a recovery." The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "Any
party may intervene, subject to being stricken out by the court for
sufficient cause.

,12

While these rules have not been developed in cases involving uninsured motorist insurance, they cannot be disregarded where an insurance company attempts to intervene in a suit against the uninsured
motorist. Whether or not the insurer is allowed to intervene must be
determined at least in part on the basis of these rules.
INTERVENTION IN UNINSURED

MOTORIST CASES

The only Texas case reported to date concerning intervention by an
insurer in a suit brought by its insured against an uninsured motorist
is Allstate Insurance Company v. Hunt.1 Allstate had issued an automobile liability insurance policy to Hunt which included uninsured
motorist coverage. In 1964 Hunt was involved in an accident with
Eurice Rose and sued Rose to recover for injuries sustained in this
accident. In a letter to Hunt, Allstate agreed to be bound, regarding
both liability and damages, by the judgment in the suit against Rose.
At the trial, Allstate's attorney attempted to intervene and participate
in the defense of the suit against the uninsured. Allstate's attorney was
excluded from the trial; the court holding that his conduct on behalf
of the defendant was in conflict with the interests of Allstate's insured.
The trial proceeded and Hunt obtained a judgment against Rose.
Thereafter, Hunt and Allstate appeared before the trial court and,
based on the prior letter of Allstate, the insurance policy, other evidence
of record, and the judgment against Rose, the trial court awarded Hunt
the full amount of the uninsured motorist coverage. Allstate appealed
the decision denying intervention. The court of civil appeals in Houston affirmed the trial court and held that an insurer could not defend
the uninsured motorist because of the potential conflict of interest created by such a procedure. 14 The court of civil appeals pointed out that:
If the insured brings suit against the uninsured motorist and the
company is permitted to defend such uninsured motorist, the
company would attempt to prove either the negligence of its own
10

Ragland v. Wisrock, 61 Tex. 391 (1884); Van Bibber v. Geer, 12 Tex. 15 (1854).

11 McAdow Motor Co. v. Luckett, 131 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1939, no writ).
12 TEX. R. Civ. P. 60.
18450 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App Houston [14th District] 1970, writ granted).
14 Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 2 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

1970]

COMMENTS

insured, or the uninsured motorist's freedom from negligence.
Either determination would inure to the benefit of the insurance
company. The company interests are therefore opposed to those
of its own insured. 15
It cannot be argued that the insurer would in fact benefit by either
of the determinations for which the court expressed its regard. However,
a different conclusion may be reached if the possibilities of the case
are looked at from a broader point of view than the conflict of interests
consideration. Suppose that the uninsured motorist could show that
the insured was contributorily negligent, or that he (the uninsured)
was free from negligence. In either situation, the insured could neither
recover from the uninsured motorist, nor from the insurance company.
The insured's right to collect under the policy would be no more
affected by the insurance company, as intervenor, proving he was not
entitled to recover, than if the defendant-uninsured motorist alone
accomplished the same result. In either case the issue for determination
is whether the insured has the right to recover from the uninsured
motorist. It may be presumed that the insured would be able to prove
his right to recover, if he had such a right, regardless of who represented
the uninsured motorist, or who intervened. If the insured could prove
his right to recover in a suit against the uninsured motorist alone, but
could not prove it if the insurance company were allowed to intervene,
it would probably be because the insurance company has information
which would preclude recovery. A problem thus arises, whether justice
can be better served by allowing the recovery from the uninsured
motorist when in fact recovery should not have been allowed; or by
permitting the insurance company to intervene and oppose the interests
of its own insured. It is submitted that the insurer could not disprove
the insured's case unless there was, in fact, evidence which showed
the uninsured motorist was not liable, and therefore, the insured
could not be truly prejudiced by the apparent conflict of interests
resulting from the intervention of the insurer on behalf of the uninsured motorist.
There are very few Texas cases concerning uninsured motorist
coverage, and no cases earlier than Allstate v. Hunt concerning intervention by the insurance company on behalf of the uninsured motorist.
However, there are cases in other jurisdictions which have decided this
particular point which could be helpful in shaping Texas law.
A case providing a different viewpoint from that in Allstate v. Hunt
is State v. Craig.1" There the insured filed suit against the uninsured
motorist, who later defaulted. State Farm's motion to intervene on
15 Id. at 672.
16

364 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
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behalf of the defendant was overruled. State Farm then initiated a
proceeding to mandamus the trial court to allow it to intervene in the
suit. The appellate court allowed limited intervention on the issues
of liability and damages holding that the company should be permitted
to intervene as a matter of right.' T Essential to this right is that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct operation of the judgment to be
rendered.' 8 The court saw no conflict of interest between the company
and neither the insured nor the uninsured motorist. The company
was not the insurer of the defendant, nor was it called to defend the
insured against a counter-claim by the defendant.' 9 This is essentially
the same situation as Allstate v. Hunt, except there was no indication
that the uninsured motorist had defaulted. If there is truly a conflict
of interest, as the Texas court of civil appeals has held, and if this is a
determining factor in denying or allowing intervention, it is presumed
that Allstate would not have been allowed to intervene even if the uninsured motorist had defaulted. In allowing intervention the Missouri
court noted this injustice by stating "If this be true, the insurer . .. will
be denied its day in court for the determination of . . .issues which
20
directly affect its liability."
In Wert v. Burke,21 two general conditions were required for the
insurer to intervene on behalf of an uninsured motorist in a suit by the
insured: (1) the possibility of inadequate representation of the interests
of the applicant for intervention; and (2) the possibility that the judgment would be binding on the applicant.22 More specifically, the court
placed the following qualification on the insurer's right to intervene:
(1) that it be first established that the defendant is uninsured; (2) that
the intervenor acknowledge that it will be bound by the judgment,
subject to the right of appeal; (3) that the intervenor take the case with
the issues as joined, unless it can show that it can prove otherwise or
that it should be allowed to raise a new issue; and (4) such other con28
ditions as the trial court may reasonably impose. Whether the judgment against the uninsured motorist would or might be binding on
the insurer without it taking part in the suit and without its agreement
to be so bound has not been decided in Texas. It appears that the
wording of the standard policy precludes the judgment from having
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.

at 349.
at 346.

at 347.
21 197 N.E.2d 717 (I1. Ct. App. 1964).
22 Id. at 719.
28

Id. at 720.
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that effect. 24 However, this may not be the case where the insurer cannot
prove a good-faith refusal of consent to being bound.
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Pietrosh,25 the insurer was given
notice of the insured's uninsured motorist claim, and of the suit against
the uninsured motorist, but refused to consent to the suit. The court
held that the insurer had the burden of affirmative action to "... . consent to suit.., or intervene. '26 Since the insurer was given the opportunity to intervene, the judgment thereafter obtained against the
uninsured motorist bound the insurer despite the contrary endorsement
in the policy. The court acknowledged that its holding forces the insurer
to intervene but concluded that "the avoidance of multiple litigation
carries the greater weight. '2 7 The decision clearly implies that intervention would be allowed in situations where the insurer consents to be
bound by the judgment against the uninsured motorist. Two Illinois
cases 28 have held the insurer bound by the judgment notwithstanding
the lack of consent and the policy clause against being bound without
consent. In both cases, where the insurance company furnished no
reason for its refusal to consent, the court held that the insurer's
consent to sue was not required, in order to bind the insurer by a
judgment against the uninsured motorist. In Levy v. American Automobile Ins. Co. the court found an implied promise not to arbitrarily
or unreasonably withhold its consent. 29 In Andeen v. Country Mutual
Ins. Co. the insurer should either have consented to suit or demanded
arbitration.8 0
A line of Georgia cases base their decision as to intervention on the
Georgia Uninsured Motorist Act.81 This act, unlike the Texas statute,
entitles the insurer to "file pleadings, and take other action allowable
by law in the name of either the known (uninsured) owner or operator
or both or itself"3 2 in an action by its insured. The insurer is allowed
to dispute jurisdiction and assert the non-liability of the uninsured
Part IV of the Texas Family Combination Automobile Policy provides:
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally responsible
for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the insured and the company,
of the issues of liability of such person or organization or of the amount of damages
to which the insured is legally entitled unless such judgment is entered pursuant
to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of the company.
24

25454 P.2d 106 (Nev. 1969).
26Id. at 110.
27Id. at Ill.
App. Ct. 1961);
28 Levy v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 175 N.E.2d 607 (Ill.
Andeen v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 217 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966).
29 175 N.E.2d 607, 611 (111. App. Ct. 1961).
App. Ct. 1966).
30 217 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ill.
81 GA. CODE ANN. art. 56-407.1 (Supp. 1968).
82 GA. CODE ANN. art. 56-407.1(d) (Supp. 1968).
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Under the act, the injured party's

insurance company may defend an action against an unknown motorist.
Where there is an action against a known uninsured motorist a copy
of the petition and process must be served upon the insured party's
insurance company. To show the liability of an insurance company
under an uninsured motorist policy it is only necessary to show the
4
rendition of a judgment against the uninsured motorist.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Glover, the Georgia
Court of Appeals stated that it did not consider a conflict of interest
to exist between the insurer and insured, any more than would logically
exist if the insurer denied coverage under the contract. 85 The court
limited its decision to cases in which the defendant uninsured motorist
defaults and the insurance company has evidence sufficient to raise a jury
question as to its own liability.8 6 The court was also of the opinion that
the circumstances of the particular case should determine whether or
not the insurer would be allowed to intervene. 87
The Glover decision was not applied in American Mutual Ins. Co.
of Boston v. Aderholt.8 In this case the insurer brought an action for a
declaratory judgment to determine its rights under an exclusion clause
of the policy. The court held that the insurer could intervene in order
to contest the liability of the uninsured motorist, but it could not
intervene for a declaration of its rights under an exclusion clause of the
policy.8 9 The case, by implication, distinguishes the liability of the
uninsured motorist in tort from the liability of the insurance company
in contract. Even binding itself by the judgment against the uninsured
motorist, as to liability and damages, the insurer may still avoid paying
its insured anything by virtue of the conditions attached to the coverage.
Bringing such issues into the suit against the uninsured motorist would
be clearly irrelevant to his liability and to the amount of damages, and
the insurance company is properly prohibited from bringing up such
issues which confuse the trial of the case and make it more complex.
The Glover decision was extended in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Brown 40 to situations where the uninsured motorist is not in

default in the suit brought by the insured. The court refused to distinguish the Brown and Glover cases on the basis of the default by the
defendant in Glover.41 The opinion of the court was that the insurer
83 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Glover, 149 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App.
1966).
84 Id. at 856.
85 Id.
8e Id.
87 Id.
88 151 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
89 Id. at 834.
40 152 S.E.2d 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
41 Id. at 646.
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has a direct and immediate interest to protect when its insured sues an
uninsured motorist, and "it stands to lose or gain by the direct effect of
the judgment, ' 42 regardless of whether the uninsured motorist defends
43
himself or not.
In Continental Insurance Company v. Smith, et al. the court pointed
out that a condition for intervention is the obligation of the insurer to
protect the insured within the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage
and to pay any judgment obtained against the defendant. 44 It is because
of this obligation that the company can establish a right of intervention.
If the company does not recognize or assume this obligation, the company will lose the right to intervene. Where the company is not willing
to concede protection it has no right to intervene in the action. 45 In
other words, where the company had contractual grounds for avoiding
the policy, the liability of the uninsured motorist will not be conclusive
of the liability of the company. Therefore, the company has no interest
which requires protection and thus no right to intervene.
The rule from Smith was applied in United Services Automobile
Association v. Logue to overrule an insurer's motion to intervene in an
action by its insured against an uninsured motorist. 46 In this case, the
insurer sought to avoid its obligations under the uninsured motorist
coverage because of the insured's alleged breach of certain policy conditions. The court reiterated the Georgia position that intervention is
allowed only where the insurer concedes its obligation, within the
limits of the uninsured motorist coverage, to pay any judgment obtained
against the defendant uninsured motorist.47 In refusing to concede that
the defendant is an uninsured motorist and in seeking to avoid the
coverage because of plaintiff's (insured's) policy conditions,' the insurance company was expressly negating the basis for its contention that it
had an interest which might be prejudiced by inadequate representation
or that it might be bound by a judgment in the action. 48 One of these
latter concessions must be made by the insurance
company seeking to
49
intervene, under the Georgia Civil Practice Act.
In Virginia, which has one of the most comprehensive statutes requiring uninsured motorist insurance, the legislature has decided that the
insurance company does have sufficient interest to intervene in a suit
42

Id.

48 For holdings on grounds similar to Brown, see: State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

Co. v. Jiles, 154 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); and Continental Ins. Co. v. Smith et al.,
155 S.E2d 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).
44 155 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).
45 Id. at 715.
46 162 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).
47 Id. at 13.
48 Id. at 14.
40 GA. CODE ANN. art. 81A-124(a) (Supp. 1968).
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against the uninsured motorist.5 0 The statute expressly provides that
the insured who sues the uninsured motorist must serve his insurance
company with a copy of the process, giving the company the right to
file pleadings in the name of the defendant or in its own name. 5 ' The
owner or operator of the uninsured vehicle retains the right to hire his
own counsel and take action in his own interest in connection with the
case.5 2 The Virginia statute is discussed at some length in O'Brien v.
58
Government Employees Insurance Company.
In O'Bryan v. Leibson,54 the plaintiff insured brought suit against an
uninsured motorist and against his own insurance company to collect
under the policy. The uninsured motorist counter-claimed and the
court held that the plaintiff's insurance company could not defend
plaintiff against the counter-claim and at the same time defend itself
against the plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim because of conflict of
interests.55 The insurance company had the right to defend itself in this
suit, but it could not hire attorneys to represent its insured against the
counter-claim, a right it had under the policy.
The possibility of a counter-claim is always present in this type of
suit, and was one of the reasons the Houston Court of Civil Appeals
refused Allstate's application for intervention." Where the uninsured
motorist files a counter-claim against the insured, the claim will ultimately be against the insurer of the plaintiff under the bodily injury
coverage of the plaintiff's policy. One of the standard Texas policy
clauses provides that the company will have the right to defend the
insured when an action is brought against him. 57 To have the insurer
defend the uninsured motorist by way of intervention, and at the same
time assert its right to defend the counter-claim on behalf of the plaintiff
could truly create a conflict of interest situation. The Kentucky Court,
in Leibson, did not allow the insurance company to decide which interest it wanted to protect-its interests relating to the uninsured motorist
coverage or its interests relating to the bodily injury coverage. In such
cases it usually results that the bodily injury insurance has higher limits
than the uninsured motorist insurance, the latter being limited to the
amount required under the financial responsibility laws of the state.5 8
50 VA. CODE ANN.

art 81A-124(a) (Supp. 1968).

51 VA. CODE ANN. art. 38.1-381(e)(1) (Supp. 1968).

52 Id.
53 372 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1967).
54 446 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1969).
55 Id. at 644.
58 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 450 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th District]
1970, writ granted).
57 Part I of the Texas Family Combination Automobile Policy provides that:
"... the company shall defend any suit alleging such bodily injury or property damage
and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this policy. .. .
58 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(1) (Supp. 1969).
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As a practical matter, where the company is allowed to defend only one
of the parties, it would appear to be in its greatest interest to defend
its own insured against the counter-claim, and this is probably what a
company will do if given a choice. The Kentucky court permitted the
insurance company to be joined as a defendant in the suit. It is unlikely
that Texas would allow this because of its public policy against revealing the presence of insurance in a case.
By giving up its right to defend a counter-claim, the insurance company would overcome one objection to intervention. But the insured
has the right to have the company defend him against the counter-claim.
Should the insured be allowed to force the company to give up its
position as intervenor in order to defend him against the counter-claim?
Would the potential of a counter-claim, with a requirement to defend
the insured, be sufficient reason for the company to refuse to consent
to be bound by the judgment against the uninsured motorist?
Not all of the jurisdictions in which the issue has arisen have allowed
the insurance company to take the side of the uninsured motorist. Holt
v. Bell5 9 involved an attempt by the insured to join his insurer as a party
defendant in the suit. The court declared this to be a misjoinder of
parties. The decision would probably be the same in Texas, because
of public policy against disclosure of insurance coverage in personal
injury cases. The decision appears applicable to an intervention situation. The court pointed out that placing the insurer in the position of
a defendant virtually made him the liability insurer of the defendant
thus interested in defeating plaintiff's claim.6 0 This is basically the same
situation that develops when the insurer intervenes on behalf of the
uninsured motorist.
In Allstate v. Hunt the court noted a possible conflict of interest
between the insurer and the uninsured motorist if intervention was
allowed. 61 However, where the insurer will be bound by the judgment
it is unlikely that the insurer will intentionally prejudice the uninsured
motorist's case.
A possible problem in allowing intervention is the possibility that the
defendant be indirectly prejudiced, because of insurance in the case.
This is the same possibility that exists between the insurer and insured,
when the insured is sued. The prejudice can be more damaging, however, to an uninsured motorist than to an insured who is sued. As
mentioned earlier, many persons carry liability insurance in excess of
the financial responsibility limits. A finding of liability in a bodily
injury case might hurt the insurance company more if prejudice does
59 392 P.2d 561 (Okla. 1964).
60 Id. at 363.

61 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 450 S.W.2d 668, 671 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
District] 1970, writ granted).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol2/iss2/3

10

Sceglio: Intervention by an Automobile Insurance Company in a Suit by Its

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

exist, but if the insured had sufficient coverage for himself, there is no
greater personal loss to him. However, the situation is different with the
uninsured motorist. If a verdict is excessive because of the insurance,
the uninsured motorist personally will have to pay the entire excessive
award. He will have to pay the insured the amount of the judgment
above the insurance coverage, and in a later suit, he will have to pay the
insurance company the amount to which the company became subrogated by virtue of its payments to the insured under the policy. The
fact that the defendant failed to obtain insurance which would have
protected him from personally having to pay the judgment should not
lessen the rights and protection to which he is entitled in a court of law.
CONCLUSION

The right of an insurance company to intervene must be balanced
against the rights of the parties to a fair trial. In cases where the uninsured motorist protests to being represented by the insurer, the company should not be allowed to force itself on him. He is not the company's insured and owes no duty to the company. By the same token, the
fact that he owes no duty to the company makes it possible for him to
default in the suit against him, and the company is helpless to do anything about it. One way that the company's interests could be protected
in a difficult situation is for the court to prevent this default from being
binding on the insurer. A second method of protection is to allow the
insurer to intervene on its own behalf as a party defendant. Restrictions
could be placed on the company's right to intervene, similar to those
which have been imposed in other jurisdictions.
Where the uninsured motorist does defend himself, it is reasonable
to assume that his attorney will do everything possible to protect him
from liability. It is doubtful that the insurance company would do more.
There is no real reason for allowing the insurance company to intervene
in this situation. If the insurance company believes, after the insured
has obtained judgment against the uninsured motorist, that the insured
is not entitled to recover, it may force the insured to bring action
against the company. The company would attempt to prove the reasons
for not considering itself bound by the judgment against the uninsured
motorist. This is essentially what happened in Allstate v. Hunt, and it
is a fair method of resolving the problem of protecting the insurance
company's rights.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

